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As the world struggles with the notion of reforming legal infrastructure, such reforms
will have to be translated through the culture, values and history of each country. The
United States, which cannot dictate one code or form of law, can lead the way and focus
the debate.
I. What Is Legal Infrastructure?
The Administration, working closely with the Congress, leaders in major financial centers
and emerging market economies, and the public, is seeking to build a consensus around a
"new international financial architecture." Secretary Robert Rubin has taken the lead within
the Administration in the effort to develop a global economic framework where free move-
ment of resources across national borders would bring better living conditions to more
people, but not at the cost of painful and destabilizing cycles of boom and bust. The eco-
nomic crisis that began in Asia in the summer of 1997, is but the most recent example of
such cycles. The work of global economic reform started long before Thailand "floated"
its currency in July 1997, and long before columns on the global financial situation by
eminent economists, officials and market participants became a regular feature not only in
the Financial Times but also in local papers around the United States.
The emergence of market-friendly governments in Eastern Europe roughly coincided
with the end of "the lost decade" of the Latin American debt crisis, where sovereign bor-
rowers and commercial banks appeared to emerge for good from their co-dependent fi-
nancing spiral. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was formed; its
explicit mission was to foster the transition of countries once and for all to open markets
and democracy.
The market reform efforts that accompanied the apparent resolution of the Latin Amer-
ican debt crisis and the emergence of "transition economies" in Eastern Europe appeared
somewhat more optimistic and less self-reflective than those we witness today. Of course,
today's policy makers are informed by the intervening traumas of Mexico, Thailand, Korea,
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Indonesia, Russia, and now Brazil, which have shown that transitions and exit strategies are
rarely straight-line or one-way. However, amid changing theories about proper regimes for
exchange rates, capital flows and debt restructuring, one thread remains fairly constant: the
rule of law and the importance of a stable, transparent, and equitably enforced system of
norms and rules to the functioning of local and global markets alike, whatever economic
theory they follow.
Thus, the goals of law reform initiatives set up under the auspices of multilateral devel-
opment institutions and bilateral agencies over the past decade, echoed in the reports issued
last fall by three working groups formed by Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
from twenty-two systemically significant economies in response to the crisis in Asia. The
reports stress transparency, regulation, and the importance of effective, equitably enforced,
domestic insolvency and debtor-creditor regimes.
Legal infrastructure is broader than a foreclosure law in Thailand, a commercial code in
South Africa, a corporate law in Russia or land registration in Costa Rica. Legal infrastruc-
ture is the entire system of rules, procedures and institutions that undergirds global financial
activity.
It encompasses national laws in major financial jurisdictions such as the United States,
the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany, as well as in the emerging markets worldwide.
It covers international law and institutions, from bilateral and multilateral debt restruc-
turing initiatives to new financing mechanisms, including efforts to refocus the role and
work of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the regional development
banks, their private sector financing windows and regional fora for economic cooperation.
It affects bank regulators and the courts, executive agencies and legislatures, and is deeply
implicated in the political process, social institutions and cultural heritage of diverse pop-
ulations around the world.
The very best legal infrastructure cannot prevent all crises, neither can it resolve them
all. However, an inadequate legal infrastructure can make a crisis wider, deeper, longer and
more likely. It can increase the chances of an isolated failure spreading through different
sectors of the economy, and of one country's liquidity crunch triggering a regional crisis
or worldwide contagion.
This is where clients would likely accuse lawyers of overstating our importance. After
all, for all the talk of a global economic integration, the need for a parallel process in the
legal sphere has not been palpable, at least not until recently. Why then, aside from pure
missionary zeal, should a Washington policymaker, a Kansas farmer or a Wall Street banker
care about the title system in Vietnam or the listing requirements of the Cayman Island
Stock Exchange? The answer comes in part from historical changes in the composition of
capital flows.
Through much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, governments financed
themselves externally by issuing bonds first in the United Kingdom and continental Europe,
and later also in the United States. Governments frequently defaulted on those bonds, or
unilaterally rescheduled them, cloaked in the broad sovereign immunity doctrine of old
that protected a range of their commercial activities. The wave of defaults that coincided
with the Great Depression was followed by several decades of lost market access for many
sovereign borrowers.
Lending resumed in the 1960s and accelerated in the 1970s, when commercial banks in
major industrial countries, awash with petrodollars, all but discarded risk analysis in a race
for yields on loans to developing country governments, which in turn were eager to finance
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state-run infrastructure projects with the blessing and encouragement of international de-
velopment agencies and in accordance with the economic theory of the day. The lending
boom ended abruptly Friday, the 13th of August 1982, when Mexico informed its creditors
it could no longer service its debts. Other borrowers soon followed suit.
The securitized financing patterns born of the resolution of the 1980s debt crisis, and
the privatization and liberalization trend that swept the industrialized and developing
worlds alike at about the same time, contributed to the unprecedented pattern of flows that
characterize today's capital markets.
First, foreign equity investment in emerging markets, both direct and portfolio, has risen
dramatically. This trend coincided with a wave of privatizations, which broke up and trans-
ferred to domestic and foreign private owners many of the large state-owned enterprises
financed with the loans of the 60s and 70s. Reflecting this trend was the increasing popu-
larity of country funds and depositary receipts, which allowed foreign investors to hold
shares in companies otherwise inaccessible to them.
The same private companies, as well as states and municipalities benefitting from decen-
tralization policies, also borrowed directly from foreign creditors, with minimal regulatory
restrictions and often without central government guarantees. The international commu-
nity has encouraged such direct cross-border financing as part of a sound development
strategy. Multilateral development institutions expanded their private sector and sub-
sovereign activities in an effort to catalyze private capital flows.
Complementing these trends is an increasing flow of private savings into the markets,
where investment funds, much like the investment trusts of the 1920s, compete for investor
dollars by seeking high yields abroad as interest rates remain low in major industrialized
economies.
Finally, the growing ease with which even bank debt is traded and, more importantly,
the shift to bond financing among sovereign and other emerging markets borrowers in the
wake of the 1980s debt crisis are in stark contrast to the relatively insulated environment
of commercial bank lending among a limited number of institutions and their sovereign
clients that prevailed before the crisis.
These factors combine in a picture where radically diverse kinds of borrowers, many with
no prior borrowing history or familiarity with the work of the capital markets raise funds
from a diverse group of creditors, ranging from mammoth investment banks to the pro-
verbial Belgian doctors, in the form of obligations that are increasingly easy to trade and
even harder to trace, with the help of a diverse group of intermediaries and advisors. To
complete the picture, the role of governments has become ever more complex-they are
borrowers, external creditors, restructuring agents, insurers, lenders of last resort and fa-
cilitators of private investment, not to mention regulators and economic policy makers.
Law and its institutions frame the relationships among this vastly diverse group of market
participants. Their diversity echoes in the diversity of legal regimes that impact these re-
lationships: a Belgian doctor's secure retirement may well depend on the ease with which
a British bank can recover its investment in a Thai power project, which may turn on the
way in which a Thai court will enforce liens and priorities, on the way local regulators
oversee Thai banks, and the way in which a U.K. administrator will view the bankruptcy
of a special purpose vehicle established under the laws of a small island nation far away
from Bangkok, Bristol and Brussels.
In other words, in the 1930s, most international financial relationships relied upon a
relatively limited set of legal underpinnings. Today the legal underpinnings are complex
and diverse, and touch upon almost every aspect of the law.
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I. The Legal Infrastructure Agenda
What then should be the legal infrastructure agenda for the emerging financial architec-
ture of the future? First, as indicated earlier, it is not a uniform set of rules to be imposed
on all countries regardless of their legal, political and cultural circumstance. Economists
may legitimately argue over what constitutes the most efficient bankruptcy regime under
standard temperature and pressure. However, the markets and their lawyers prize three
things above all: equity, transparency, and predictability. A bankruptcy regime that is debtor-
friendly but transparent and predictably enforced is infinitely more valuable to the creditors
than the one that favors creditors on paper, but consistently produces unforeseen results in
application. The former allows predictable valuation and informed negotiation, which may
well keep a case out of the court system, saving the parties and the government the high
transaction costs of judicial dispute resolution. The latter often leads to gaps in expectations,
stalled negotiations, and value deterioration detrimental to all.
In today's environment, the goals of a legal infrastructure effort should be (i) to enhance
transparency and predictability in financial transactions, (ii) to limit the spread and mitigate
the impact of financial crises on different sectors within the affected economy and on other
economies, and (iii) to encourage the speedy and orderly resolution of financial crises.
The first goal-transparency-involves improvements both in the making of necessary
information available to market participants, and in the functioning of institutions on which
the markets rely. Key among such institutions are regulatory authorities and the courts.
The second goal-containing failures to prevent a broader crisis-addresses legal mech-
anisms, such as insolvency regimes and debt restructuring frameworks. These laws contain
adverse financial developments at their source, and prevent them from affecting entire
financial systems, a broad range of debt instruments, or other markets through contagion.
The third goal-encouraging the speedy resolution of financial crises-focuses on fa-
cilitating voluntary, contractual solutions negotiated between debtors and creditors. For all
involved, such solutions are usually preferable to costly individual enforcement measures.
We want to focus first on transparency and predictability. Here it is most appropriate to
closely examine institution-building, on the international level at institutions like the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, and at the local and national level at the courts of law.
Transparency has been the focus of recent reform efforts at the international financial
institutions. For example, in conjunction with the IMF funding package last fall, the Ad-
ministration worked with the Congress to advance the goals of transparency, and secured
the commitment of major IMF shareholders to act to implement significant new infor-
mation disclosure policies. Our efforts have already resulted in releases of public informa-
tion notices on key policy discussions in the IMF Executive Board and on key staff papers
(such as the recent paper on the IMF's programs in Asia), in increased publication of letters
of intent, including that with Brazil, and in the posting of information on IMF liquidity,
accounts, and loans on its website.
Reform at the international financial institutions is critical not only to make these insti-
tutions respond better to the needs of their members and clients, but also because their
economic programs, increasingly and appropriately, focus on institutional reform among
their client countries. Thus IMF staff have developed a Code of Good Practices on Fiscal
Transparency that has been endorsed by the institution's Executive Board, and has been
posted on the IMF's website. The code stresses that budgets should incorporate all fiscal
information, including extra-budgetary operations, contingent liabilities, tax expenditures,
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subsidies, and quasi-fiscal activities. Staff is also developing a Code of Good Practices on
Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies that will reinforce the fiscal code by pro-
moting clear and transparent criteria for the work of central banks. Fund staff are already
beginning to examine countries' fiscal practices in light of the fiscal transparency code;
program documents are now focusing more closely on fiscal transparency issues; and staff
are prepared to offer technical assistance to help countries conform to the code.
Over the past year, crisis-affected countries in Asia have enacted literally hundreds of
laws and regulations in very difficult political circumstances to improve transparency and
corporate governance, rationalize tax and accounting rules, bar non-arms-length transac-
tions, remove impediments to foreign investment, overhaul bank and securities regulation,
establish new bankruptcy and secured transactions regimes, and many, many others. At least
on paper, we are in a radically changed world. The fact that investors may not feel the
magnitude of the change overnight owes in part to the very real difficulty of living by a
new commercial regime in an existing institutional structure, which is a product of decades,
even centuries of different practices.
Much of the recent financial crisis has been blamed on poor governance and corruption
in the emerging market economies. Genuine transparency cannot coexist with corruption.
However, the term "corruption" may stand for a wide range of economic, cultural and legal
phenomena, and calls for sophisticated measures to combat it. Effective measures must take
into account the complex institutional and cultural frameworks in which financial trans-
actions are enmeshed.
For example, it must be recognized that in many countries judges, like other civil servants,
are paid less than half the wage they are expected to live on, and for many decades, if not
centuries, have been expected to supplement their income through "gifts" from litigants.
It also must be recognized that until recently, some major industrial countries made such
"gifts" tax-deductible for their companies investing abroad.
Working for transparency and predictability in financial markets thus may require a close
look at the composition and function of the local bar in emerging markets economies: what
is the lawyers' relationship to the judges? To their clients? Are they formally bound by
ethical standards? Who monitors and enforces such standards? What is the social status of
a lawyer in the community? What is expected of a local practitioner in a financial transaction
(this varies quite drastically even between the United States and Europe)? What is the value
of a legal opinion? What is the role of the government lawyer, such as the public prosecutor
or attorney general? When does the government have a formal role in a commercial case?
What is the role of foreign lawyers in the local business community?
Independent, knowledgeable regulators are an integral part of today's financial markets.
Yet the role, authority, and training of regulators vary widely among different countries.
For example, even where bank regulators may be well established, stock exchanges, secu-
rities regulators, and bank resolution agencies may be quite new, suffering from confused
mandates and inadequate authorities.
Systems for training lawyers and judges are critical to the overall reform effort, yet many
law schools and bar associations in emerging market countries have no resources to prepare
their constituents for the world of complex cross-border finance.
Government institutions are not the only ones in need of reform to achieve transparency
and predictability in the financial markets. Corporate governance, shareholder rights and
creditor rights are also high on the reform agenda. Corporate organization in different
countries is driven not only or even primarily by the laws on the books today, but reflects
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peculiarities of cultural heritage, economic history and decades of government economic
policies.
Thus, in some countries, a prominent family with a nominal stake in a holding company
may effectively control a web of enormous conglomerates tied together with a complex
pattern of cross-holdings, subsidies, guarantees and supply contracts. Outside shareholders
or creditors may never know the complexity of the real organizational structure and are
unlikely to be able to voice their concerns effectively in this setting. Even after the invest-
ment regime is liberalized, such problems persist and require deep, tedious, and expensive
reforms in accounting, taxation, share registration, and secured transactions law, among
others, to achieve effective reform.
Finally, equity must be a part of the transparency and predictability agenda. For example,
similarly situated creditors should be presumptively treated alike. Neither foreign nor do-
mestic creditors should benefit from "special deals" unless agreed to in a binding, trans-
parent and bargained-for arrangement.
In retrospect, it is puzzling that vast amounts of capital flowed into environments that
appeared so lacking in transparency and predictability. This suggests that legal, regulatory
and institutional reform in this area should be of concern to capital exporting as well as
capital importing countries.
That is why regulators, policynakers, international organizations and market participants
in major financial centers, including the Federal Reserve, the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision, and the International Monetary Fund, as well as the President's Working
Group on Financial Markets, are reviewing risk management and supervision practices, as
well as capital and disclosure standards that affect the behavior of investors in the inter-
national markets. Highly leveraged institutions and offshore financial centers have been the
focus of particular attention.
Furthermore, official and private self-regulatory international organizations are devel-
oping model codes and standards on corporate governance, securities regulation and ac-
counting, among others, and are working to develop a consensus among market participants
to abide by such standards.
As one commentator noted [Thomas Carothers in Foreign Affairs, March/April 1998],
deep institutional reform of the sort discussed here is difficult and thankless, and takes many
decades to yield results. It is expensive and takes much longer than drafting a constitution
or even a commercial code, and does not bring quick glory or leverage to providers of
foreign assistance. However, without institutional reform, new laws will not have the sup-
port of the legal community whose mandate it is to enforce them. Much as they might
support a free market, local lawyers and business people will not rally behind laws and
regulations they do not understand or believe in. Thus, a new legal infrastructure must be
comprehensive and inclusive.
We now want to turn to the second goal: developing legal mechanisms to act as safe-
guards, to stop isolated failures from triggering full-blown crises, as well as to help speed
crisis resolution.
Of course, corporate governance, creditor rights and disclosure measures already dis-
cussed earlier act as important checks and balances for a company facing crisis.
Here we focus on the importance of bankruptcy and foreclosure laws, which received
much attention in the wake of the recent financial crisis in Asia. This subject is also par-
ticularly appropriate because it illustrates the importance of institutional reform discussed
earlier.
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Ill. Indonesia-A Case Study
The profile of Indonesia's financial crisis reflects dramatically the recent change in the
composition of capital flows. Fully half of Indonesia's external debt to private creditors at
the end of 1997, approximately $65 billion, represented direct, largely unhedged cross-
border borrowing by private non-bank corporations, mostly from banks offshore. Much of
that borrowing, according to some reports as high as forty percent, was backed in various
forms by export credit agencies in industrial countries. The International Finance Corpo-
ration, the private sector financing arm of the World Bank Group, also had considerable
exposure to the Indonesian private sector.
The weaknesses of Indonesia's legal system, particularly in the judiciary, had been well
known before the crisis. In fact, the country had been the beneficiary of legal technical
assistance efforts funded by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the U.S.
Agency for International Development.
In view of the significant portion of the country's indebtedness attributable to private
corporations, corporate workouts clearly had to be a major part of Indonesia's crisis re-
sponse strategy. However, it was widely believed that Indonesian debtors were not con-
strained by fear of bankruptcy liquidation in their dealings with creditors, and that creditors
stood no chance of predictable or equitable treatment in such liquidation if it were ever to
happen.
In the United States and many other major financial centers, a well-functioning insol-
vency regime is recognized as critical to limiting the effects of corporate failure on the
financial system, to mitigating resulting unemployment, and to resuming economic activity.
Therefore, insolvency reform was viewed by many in the international community as critical
to Indonesia's recovery.
An internationally-supported bankruptcy reform effort was underway in Indonesia when
the crisis struck. It envisioned a new bankruptcy code to replace the Dutch colonial bank-
ruptcy code of 1906 vintage, and a new, independent tribunal. All agreed that such radical
change was necessary and desirable in the long run; however, some expressed concerns
about making wholesale revisions of the insolvency system in the midst of a severe economic
crisis.
Under the April 30, 1998, IMF program, the Indonesian authorities committed to make
a series of amendments to the existing bankruptcy law. Many of these were modeled after
similar amendments made in the course of this century to a similar Dutch law still largely
in effect in Holland. The amendments tightened deadlines, rationalized the treatment of
secured debt, provided for the appointment of ad hoc judges and receivers from the private
sector, gave the government the power to bring insolvency proceedings "in the public
interest," and provided for the establishment of a new commercial chamber in the Jakarta
court system, staffed with selected judges who would be specially trained in commercial
matters and compensated at a rate considerably higher than their counterparts in other
courts. Their decisions must be in written form and publicly available.
The court opened for business on August 20, 1998. Some, but not all, of the aspects of
the original plan were implemented. The judges underwent many hours of training; how-
ever, their compensation was not raised. The court decisions have been issued in writing
and on schedule, and, we understand, have been posted on a generally accessible website.
On the other hand, participation of well-respected private practitioners in certain com-
mercial panels has been slow to occur. In the meantime, some parts of the bar have expressed
considerable opposition to the new regime.
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From the creditors' perspective, the court's record has been mixed at best. Twenty-two
cases had been filed as of early December 1998, on behalf of both foreign and Indonesian
creditors, against both large and small companies, as well as several personal bankruptcy
petitions. Four debtors have been declared bankrupt, out-of-court settlements resulted in
several cases, while several other claims have been dismissed. At least two of the dismissed
cases were appealed to the Indonesian Supreme Court. Both have been decided against the
creditors. The latest decision, issued recently, rejected an appeal by the IFC, among other
creditors.
Foreign and Indonesian creditors alike, as well as many in Jakarta's legal community,
have suggested that the commercial court's decisions betray inadequate command of cor-
porate finance. Allegations of corruption have been voiced as well. The first Supreme Court
decision on appeal from the commercial court added to the confusion: on the one hand, it
corrected what many thought was an ill-founded interpretation of the bankruptcy law in
the lower court's opinion; on the other hand, it proceeded to rule against the creditors on
different grounds in a decision that has been criticized by many in the Indonesian legal and
business community.
Again, the problem is not that the courts are ruling against creditors, but that they are
doing so on what appear to be suspect legal grounds, in a manner that lacks predictability
in the conventional legal sense, and raises concerns about transparency.
In the meantime, the government, with help from the IMF and the World Bank, took
certain measures to facilitate out-of-court workouts. Specifically, the Government of In-
donesia established the Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA) and implemented
the so-called "Jakarta Initiative." INDRA offered a measure of protection from further
depreciation of the exchange rate to companies that restructure their debts to fit a specified
profile. The second initiative, based loosely on the "London Approach" established by the
Bank of England in the 1980s, was a voluntary negotiation framework, including standards
for disclosure, combined with initiatives to remove legal, tax, and regulatory impediments
to common restructuring techniques (such as asset sales and debt-equity swaps), a stream-
lined process for obtaining regulatory approvals, facilitation services, and power to bring
insolvency cases before the new tribunal on behalf of the government to further the public
interest.
Creditors have been skeptical, and justly so. However, we are seeing the first signs of
movement. Although the commercial court's record continues to be disconcerting, new
cases continue to be brought. Press reports have begun to trickle in of tentative agreements
to restructure in high-profile cases with the help of the Jakarta Initiative.
IV. What Are the Lessons of This Experience?
First, institutional reform must accompany substantive law reform in such vital areas as
bankruptcy. No matter what the contents of the regime and its bias toward debtors or
creditors, it is worthless if not enforced predictably, transparently and equitably. Creditors
are apt to put a steep discount on the uncertainty of enforcement. This in turn lowers asset
prices, impairs a market in distressed assets, hurts recovery rates for domestic financial
institutions, and may potentially represent a fiscal liability for the government. Note that
although their core mission is financial sector rehabilitation, central banks and entities such
as the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) play a key role in corporate workouts.
As they take on the bad assets of financial institutions, they become the country's predom-
inant corporate creditors.
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The limited success of recent asset auctions in Indonesia and Thailand has been attrib-
uted, at least in part, to the continuing weakness of the insolvency and debtor-creditor
regimes in these countries. In Thailand, in particular, the Parliament's failure to pass a
foreclosure law has been cited by market participants as harmful to asset prices.
Second, institutional reform is slow and requires the building of trust and legitimacy in
the legal and business community. The local judiciary and the bar must be a part of the
process. Seemingly mundane issues like judges' salaries and resources to publish opinions
may turn out to be critical to its success.
Third, in an uncertain environment, law and judicial reform are best complemented by
a strong, government-driven, out-of-court workout scheme that provides a ready alternative
to costly and uncertain litigation. Law reform and government policy should support and
legitimize such out-of-court efforts, hence the importance of allowing for quick government
approval of a workout negotiated between debtors and creditors without recourse to judicial
proceedings.
Fourth, laws and regulations are often impediments to restructuring and at times unwit-
tingly exacerbate crises and slow workouts. While enacting new commercial laws may be
critical, it is equally important to examine thoroughly existing legal, regulatory, and tax
measures that may act as obstacles to restructuring. For example, a number of countries
bar or penalize debt-equity swaps. Such measures may need to be removed, supplemented
or clarified, perhaps temporarily, to facilitate workouts in crisis.
Fifth, there is a trade-off between executive/administrative and legislatively approved
measures taken in crisis. There is a long history of governments fighting crises by executive
decree. On the other hand, unilateral executive action may prompt a backlash against reform
on the part of the legislature. This is a political calculation that only the national govern-
ment can make, but the international community should take note of the risks involved.
This last section focuses on legal measures that the private and official creditor com-
munity may take to combat crises. Rather than examine the pros and cons of international
liquidity packages, which all have interesting legal implications, we want to focus on mea-
sures that governments and others in creditor countries can take to facilitate speedy and
orderly debt restructuring when crisis hits. Three areas should be explored: contract clauses,
cross-border insolvency reform, and reviewing legal impediments to restructuring in cred-
itor countries.
A. CONTRACT CiAUSES
External debt documentation for sovereign borrowers is relatively standardized. There
are a number of provisions in debt contracts that could facilitate collective action among a
diverse group of creditors in a workout, which for the sovereign borrower could fulfill some
of the same functions that insolvency law provisions fulfill for the private borrower. Among
these are provisions that allow a specified majority of bondholders to amend key terms of
their instruments in a restructuring-already common in English law bonds but rare in the
U.S. market. Such clauses are not a panacea-they cannot inflict a restructuring on an
unwilling majority of creditors, nor can they ensure the success of a comprehensive workout.
However, they can help facilitate market-based solutions where default cannot otherwise
be avoided, and should be used more broadly.
In 1996, and again in 1998, the international official community publicly supported
broadening the range of documentation that includes such clauses (in the so-called G-10
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and G-22 reports on financial crises), although the private sector has been somewhat slow
to act in this area.
The reluctance is understandable, particularly in today's volatile market. However, in the
absence of a sovereign bankruptcy regime, it is in the interest of all-creditors, debtors,
and the international community-to improve the likelihood of a consensual out-of-court
restructuring, to avoid maverick action by a small minority of creditors, and to minimize
recourse to costly, time-consuming judicial enforcement measures.
B. CROss-BORDER INSOLVENCY REFORM
The United Nations Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has pro-
posed the adoption of a Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency by member states of the
United Nations. The purpose of the law is not to standardize substantive bankruptcy re-
gimes around the world. Rather, it is to facilitate resolution of increasingly frequent cases
of complex cross-border insolvency, where companies have assets in several jurisdictions at
once. The Model Law would enable the foreign representative (receiver) in a foreign in-
solvency proceeding to apply to be recognized by a domestic court. If a showing of certain
procedural and due process protections is made, the court could impose a stay on creditor
action against the assets of a foreign company.
Thus, for example, if a U.S. company with mines in an Asian country filed for insolvency
protection in the United States, and the Asian country has adopted the UNCITRAL Model
Law, the company's U.S. creditors would be protected against asset stripping in that coun-
try. Similarly, if a Latin American debtor with assets and creditors in the United States filed
for bankruptcy in its home country, a U.S. court would freeze such assets under the
UNCITRAL Model Law on a showing that the foreign court has observed the parties' due
process rights in its proceedings.
Facilitation and harmonization of cross-border workout regimes thus necessarily go to-
gether with national insolvency reform in the emerging market economies. The Model
Law was introduced in both Houses in the last Congress, and has enjoyed considerable
bipartisan support. However, as part of broader, more controversial legislation, it failed to
pass the Senate last fall.
C. REMOVING IMPEDIMENTS TO RESTRUCTURING IN CREDITOR COUNTRIES
The debt restructuring experience of the 1980s and early 1990s has taught us that reg-
ulatory, tax and accounting regimes governing creditors are all-important in motivating
creditor decisions in debt negotiations.
Some industrialized countries have laws, regulations, tax, and accounting rules that make
it difficult for their financial institutions to participate in workouts on commercial terms.
For example, certain regulatory impediments and disincentives appear to influence the abil-
ity of Japanese banks to engage in corporate workouts abroad on commercial terms. Since
Japanese financial institutions are major creditors to corporations in crisis-affected countries
in Asia, these disincentives have delayed workouts, resulted in valuation discrepancies, ruled
out certain common restructuring options, and exacerbated discord on multinational cred-
itor committees. As part of the multilateral Asian Growth and Recovery Initiative jointly
announced last November by President Clinton and Prime Minister Obuchi, creditor coun-
tries have pledged to examine and address impediments to restructuring that may constrain
their financial institutions abroad.
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V. Conclusion
The ever-increasing volume and diversity of today's capital flows make the rule of law
and legal reform central to the effort of building a new global financial architecture.
Developing a legal infrastructure for the global markets is complex and time-consuming.
It demands much respect, patience, and learning about diverse national legal systems and
the way they interact with one another and today's financial markets. In pursuing the reform
agenda we must look inward as well as outward, and judge the others' progress against our
practice rather than our theory. It has taken this country over two hundred years to build
the laws and institutions that have made it a major financial center and that continue to
inspire confidence in domestic and foreign investors.
A key feature of our legal system is its ability to change while remaining thoroughly
grounded in the principles of transparency, predictability and equity. Now, more than ever,
capacity to change and to respond to change without compromising these fundamental
principles is a critical element of legal infrastructure.
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